

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZEDMEMORANDUMTO: C/P
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SUBJECT: [] Future Position

1. The premise of this paper is that [] if he consents, should be made to emerge, either shortly before D-day or on D-day as the Chief of whatever Junta then exists and as the head of the new interim Guatemalan government.
2. Needless to say, [] actual power position has long been a matter of doubt. This doubt has been created, first and foremost, by [] himself: he has vacillated between statements to the effect that he wished to be "only a private citizen" and indications of frustrated ambition. Francis T. MYLKES speculated, probably with some justification, that [] "resignation" may have been prompted by long-range ambition rather than disgust. In view of the conflicting evidences of [] real desires, it will be important to flush him out at the earliest possible opportunity. If the general concept of this paper is agreed upon, [] can be approached by REELFOOT with a concrete proposition, whereas in the past the GROUP has had to be guided more by what appeared to be [] own wishes in the matter of his position.
3. There is now available sufficient evidence to indicate that the revolutionary JUNTA, no matter how composed, will be fraught with considerable internal rivalry. The distaste of [] SMILAX and other leading Guatemalan army officers who could presumably won to the anti-Communist cause, if they are not already passively dedicated to it, for CALLIGERIS is established. There is every reason to believe that CALLIGERIS reciprocates such feelings. To be on the safe side, it must be assumed that there are other factions besides those of [] and CALLIGERIS who will be wanting to share post-revolutionary power.
4. [] however, is not now and has never been a party to this internecine strife in the army. He has the appearance of a patrician and the temperament of a moderator. Properly guided, he can cut an impressive, benevolent and relatively non-controversial public figure. According to available information, he enjoys a good reputation in Guatemala; his only political liability, his association with [] would presumably no longer be as large a liability after the revolution.
5. Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that [] would be the most "distinguished" and conciliatory front for the revolutionary Junta.

He would give the Guatemalan public a feeling of calm and confidence and he would moderate, or at least conceal, the mutual recrimination of the military parties to victory. With [] as the public figurehead for the revolutionary Junta, time would be gained in which the struggles between [] CALLIGERIS and others would either be harmoniously dissolved or decided in favor of whichever military leader was able to mobilize the most power. With [] at the helm these conflicts in the Junta could be sufficiently concealed or placated until such time as they no longer redounded to the benefit of the Communists. Without [] as a kind of umpire, it is possible that the rivalries within the military could erupt at a time when the anti-Communist forces had not yet consolidated their hold on the country.

6. If the foregoing concept is approved, [] could be launched by a series of speeches which he would make over SHERWOOD just prior to D-day. Likewise, the D-day programs and consolidation posters, now featuring the portrait and prose of CALLIGERIS, could be re-printed in the name of []. It may also be possible, by arrangement with ODACID, to have the ODACID representative, at the appropriate time indicate to the victorious revolutionary Junta that it is ODACID's understanding that [] is the head of the Junta.

7. The foregoing is obviously dependent on two principal factors:

- A. [] willingness to accept this projected role and responsibility.
- B. [] command of certain assets in both the civilian and military spheres of Guatemala life.

These points should be explored with [] at the first available opportunity.

8. It is believed that if the foregoing personal focus is given to [] activities, he will be able to plan his post-revolutionary political action program much more effectively.

Jeremy T. NUTTING/gfb
17 May 1954